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COMMENT 
CHALLENGING ADHESION 
CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA: 
A CONSUMER'S GUIDE 
INTRODUCTION 
Adhesion contracts! are infused into the lives of all con-
sumers.2 Consumers engaging in even the simplest of transac-
tions are likely to enter into an adhesion contract before the 
services will be provided.3 More complicated services such as 
telephone or credit services are inevitably accompanied with a 
lengthy set of terms and conditions.4 These contracts are of-
fered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.s The consumer either ac-
1 "Adhesion contract" is defined as follows: "A standard-form contract prepared 
by one party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, usu. a consumer, who has 
little choice about the terms. - Also termed contract of adhesion; adhesory contract; 
adhesionary contract; take-it-or-Ieave-it contract; leonine contract." BLACKS LAw 
DICTIONARY 318-319 (7th ed. 1999). 
2 See Wolfgang Friedmann, Law and Social Change in Contemporary Britain, p. 
45, cited in Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1961) ("[Tlhe impact of these standardized contracts can hardly be exaggerated. 'Most 
contracts which govern our daily lives are of a standardised [sicl character.'" ). 
3Id. ("We travel under standard terms, by rail, ship, aeroplane, or tramway. 
We make contracts for life or accident assurances under standardised [sicl conditions. 
We rent houses or rooms under similarly controlled terms; authors or broadcasters, 
whether dealing with public or private institutions, sign standard agreements; gov-
ernment departments regulate the conditions of purchases by standard conditions.'"). 
4 See Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126 (9th Cir. 2003) (telephone services contract); 
Bank One, N.A. v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001) (credit services pro-
gram). 
5 Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976). 
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cepts the contract or seeks services elsewhere.6 Often, how-
ever, the consumer is unable to seek services elsewhere.7 
Generally, adhesion contracts create a power imbalance 
where the company, as the drafting party, controls all the con-
tract terms.S In Cook's Pest Control v. Rebar,9 however, the 
consumer took the upper-hand. Io Margo Rebar and her hus-
band Robert entered into a one-year agreement with Cook's 
Pest Control to ensure their home stayed termite-free,u After a 
year of poor service by Cook's, termites infested the Rebar 
home and little was done to fix it.12 
The original service contract between the Rebars and 
Cook's contained a mandatory arbitration provision, specifying 
that disputes under the contract be settled through binding 
arbitration, denying the Rebars any right to sue Cook's in a 
court oflawY Despite this unfavorable clause in their contract, 
the Rebars wanted to sue Cook's in Superior Court for breach 
of contract.14 This is a typical problem that commonly arises 
when companies use adhesion contracts to impose terms upon 
consumers.15 
6 SeeId. 
7 A consumer may be unable to seek services elsewhere for a variety of reasons. 
See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775. One common reason is lack of practicality. Id. A 
patient seeking services at a hospital, for instance, is unlikely to shop around for favor-
able admission terms. Id. Another fact which may limit a consumer's ability to shop 
around for a favorable contract is the lack of options in the market. See Ting, 319 F.3d 
at 1130 ("AT&T enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the nation's telephone industry."). 
Further, because of the predominance of adhesion contracts in the market place, most 
companies offer similar contracts. Interview with Janice Kosel, Professor of Law, 
Golden Gate University School of Law, in San Francisco, Cal. (Sept. 25, 2003). The 
ability to shop around is, as a result, extinguished. Id. 
S See Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784 ("The term signifies a standardized contract, 
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to 
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.") 
9 Cook's Pest Control v. Rebar, 852 So. 2d 730 (Ala. 2002). 
10 Robert Harris, Ex-Terminating the Requirement to Arbitrate, The Connecticut 
Law Tribune, June 16, 2003. 
BId. 
12Id. 
13Id. 
14Id. 
15 See Robert Schwartz, Note, Can Arbitration Do More For Consumers? The 
TILA Class Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 809, 810 (2003) ("Businesses have 
become enamored of arbitration clauses. These boilerplate contractual provisions-
which typically provide that any conflicts under a commercial contract will be resolved 
by a private dispute-resolution agency rather than a court of law-have become part of 
everyday commercial life.") 
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Companies use adhesion contracts so they can deal with 
their customers in a uniform manner.16 In many situations, 
negotiating individual contracts with each consumer would be 
impractical, for both cost and time considerations.17 Without 
adhesion contracts, companies would be forced to staff attor-
neys to oversee every transaction in which the company en-
gages. 1S The financial burden of negotiating individual con-
tracts with each customer makes such a practice unrealistic in 
many situations.19 Having an attorney, likely in-house counsel, 
draft, on behalf of the company, a standardized contract to 
which all consumers will be bound preserves the company's 
legal interests in the most economic manner.20 The problem 
arises when companies insert provisions unfavorable to the 
consumer.21 This is a natural occurrence as companies strive to 
draft contracts favoring their own best interests.22 
Many times, consumers neither understand nor read adhe-
sion contracts.23 Even if a consumer reads and understands an 
adhesion contract, there is no room for negotiation.24 Should 
consumers find a term unfavorable, often, their only option is 
to tum elsewhere for services.25 As a result, consumers are 
stuck with oppressive one-sided agreements.26 Frequently, con-
sumers do not even find out about oppressive clauses contained 
in these agreements until a dispute arises and attorneys be-
come involved. 27 Consumers must have some way to challenge 
these types of contracts. 
16 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 810 ("[B]usinesses perceive arbitration to be a 
faster, cheaper, and more predictable method of resolving a dispute than the typical 
lawsuit in the public courts. These advantages are particularly attractive to large 
companies that engage in repeated uniform contracts with many customers.") 
17 Id. 
18 Richard Sybert, Adhesion Theory in California: A Suggested Redefinition and 
its Application to Banking, 11 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 297, 297-298 (1978), cited in Graham 
v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165, 171 n.15 (Cal. 1981). 
19 [d. 
20 Id. 
21 See generally Ting, 319 F.3d at 1133 (placement of a mandatory arbitration 
provision into an adhesion contract). 
22 See Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784. 
23 Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 824 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) 
(subscribing party to adhesion contract did not read provision contained therein). 
24 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783 (hospital's admission form offered subscribing 
party no room to negotiate terms). 
25 Id. 
26 See Id. 
27 Id at 780. 
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Mter consulting with an expert on extermination law, the 
Rebars found a way around the terms in their adhesion con-
tract with Cook's.28 The original service contract which the Re-
bars signed contained an automatic renewal clause, wherein 
the contract would automatically renew after a year, so long as 
the Rebars paid their renewal fee. 29 When it came time to send 
in the yearly renewal fee, Margo Rebar sent Cook's a check 
with something extra. 30 Enclosed with the check was a docu-
ment entitled "Addendum31 to Consumer Agreement. "32 The 
addendum disavowed the duty to arbitrate "for any prior or 
future dealings" between the Cook's and the Rebars33 and pro-
vided that its terms would become effective once the check was 
cashed.34 
This clever legal maneuver worked.35 The Rebars waited 
for the check to clear, and then brought suit against Cook's in 
state court.36 Cook's argued against the enforcement of the ad-
dendum; however, the Alabama Supreme Court held the ad-
dendum validly absolved the Rebars of any duty to arbitrate.37 
Thus, despite Cook's use of an oppressive term in the original 
adhesion contract, the Rebars won the right to bring suit 
against Cook's in state court.38 
Although the Rebars were successful in changing the 
terms of their contract, generally, consumers cannot rely on 
sneaking addenda under the radar to escape oppressive clauses 
in adhesion contracts.39 Hence, consumers need judicial protec-
tion from adhesion contracts.40 Simply outlawing adhesion con-
28 Harris, supra note 10. 
29 Id. 
30Id. 
31 An addendum is defined as, "Something to be added, esp[ecially] to a docu-
ment; a supplement." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 38 (7th Ed. 1999). 
32 Harris, supra note 10. 
33Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36Id. 
37Id. 
38 Harris, supra note 10. 
39 See Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171 ("While not lacking in social advantages, 
[adhesion contracts] bear with them the clear danger of oppression and overreaching. 
It is in the context of this tension-between social advantage in the light of modern 
conditions on the one hand, and the danger of oppression on the other-that courts and 
legislatures have sometimes acted to prevent perceived abuses.") 
4°Id. 
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tracts is not a plausible solution because of the business hard-
ships it would create for companies.41 Instead, adhesion con-
tracts must be examined with some degree of suspicion.42 This 
Comment explores the California scheme for dealing with ad-
hesion contracts, and proposes a change to the existing legal 
structure. Part I describes how California courts define adhe-
sion contracts, examines the theories California courts have 
adopted to allow consumers to challenge adhesion contracts, 
and considers how jurisdictions outside California handle ad-
hesion contracts.43 Part II focuses on when California courts 
will consider a contract adhesive and unenforceable." Part III 
compares California's system of dealing with adhesion con-
tracts with systems established in jurisdictions outside Cali-
fornia in order to determine whether there is truly any sub-
stantive difference.45 Part IV suggests changes to improve the 
California system.46 Part V concludes by finding that while the 
California courts go a long way towards protecting consumers, 
there are still further steps which should be taken.47 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. DEFINING "ADHESION CONTRACTS" IN CALIFORNIA 
The first step in understanding how California interprets 
adhesion contracts is to define "adhesion contract." An "adhe-
sion contract" is a standardized contract,48 imposed and drafted 
by a party with superior bargaining power, which relegates to 
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the con-
tract or reject it.49 This procedure of presenting a contract to an 
41 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171 (citing certain "social advantages" of adhesion 
contracts). 
42 See generally Scissor·Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. 
43 See infra notes 48 to 167 and accompanying text. 
44 See infra notes 168 to 311 and accompanying text. 
45 See infra notes 312 to 351 and accompanying text. 
46 See infra notes 352 to 391 and accompanying text. 
47 See infra notes 392 to 399 and accompanying text. 
48 The mere finding of a standardized contract does not necessarily support a 
finding that a contract is adhesive. 13 MB, Contracts § 140.32[12][c]. Courts look to 
other criteria such as the relative bargaining power of the parties, ability of the adher-
ing party to negotiate for alterations, and availability of the adhering party to acquire 
the product or services from other sources. [d. 
49 Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784, cited in Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychare 
Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 689 (Cal. 2000). 
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offeree, wherein the offeree may only accept the contract as a 
whole or reject it, evokes the catch phrase, "take-it-or-Ieave-
it. "50 The adhering party may either "take" the contract by ac-
cepting it, or "leave it" by rejecting the contract.51 
Historically, the term "adhesion contract" is based on con-
cepts arising from French civillaw.52 Adhesion contracts were 
first applied in the American common law system in 1919 to 
describe life insurance contracts.53 These types of contracts 
were dubbed "adhesion contracts" because of the unequal bar-
gaining power between the insured and the insurance compa-
nies.54 The more powerful insurance companies drafted the 
contract terms and presented them to the insured, with the 
insured having no realistic ability to negotiate the policy 
terms.55 Therefore, the insured was stuck with the terms of the 
contract that the insurance company created, controlled, and 
dictated. 56 
Today, in California, determining whether a particular 
contract is an "adhesion contract" begins with the judicial 
guidance provided by the Neal u. State Farm Ins. Cos. case.57 
In Neal, the California District Court of Appeal provided a 
definition for an "adhesion contract" which is still used today: 
"[t]he term adhesion contract signifies a standardized contract, 
which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining 
strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportu-
nity to adhere to the contract or reject it."58 In Neal, the court 
interpreted the terms of an agency agreement between the par-
ties,59 determining that the contract at issue was an adhesion 
contract.60 The court then pointed out the inequities inherent 
50 See 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12][cl. 
51 See Id. 
52 Edwin Patterson, The Delivery of a Life·Insurance Policy, 33 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 
222 (1919), cited in Scissor·Tail, 623 P.2d at 171 n.1O. 
53 Id. ("Life insurance contracts are contracts of 'adhesion.' The contract is 
drawn up by the insurer and the insured, who merely 'adheres' to it, has little choice as 
to its terms. "). 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). 
Justice Mathew O. Tobriner wrote this opinion for the District Court of Appeal of Cali-
fornia in 1961. Id. 
58 Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784. 
59 Id. at 782. 
60 See Id. at 784. 
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in such contracts.61 The court stated that adhesion contracts do 
not "issue from that freedom in bargaining and equality of bar-
gaining which are the theoretical parents of the American law 
of contracts."62 
The court deemed that adhesion contracts warranted spe-
cial consideration due to the wide-reaching effect that such 
contracts have in our every day lives.63 The court found that 
most contracts which govern our daily lives are of a standard-
ized nature, including contracts for travel, insurance, and hous-
ing accommodations. 64 As a result, the Neal court closely ex-
amined the contract in light of its adhesive nature and held 
that "[t]he instant contract, prepared, drafted, and printed by 
the employer, left no room for bargaining by the individuals 
seeking employment."65 Accordingly, the court determined that 
for adhesion contracts, any ambiguities in the drafted terms 
must be interpreted against the drafting party.66 
The logic used in the Neal case remains the accepted rule 
in California.67 For example, in Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 
the California Supreme Court examined an entertainment con-
tract between Bill Graham, a Bay Area musical concert pro-
moter, and Scissor-Tail, a corporation which marketed the ser-
vices of musical groupS.68 Graham contracted with Scissor-Tail 
to promote musical concerts by a musical group that Scissor-
Tail represented.69 The contract required arbitration for any 
contractual disputes. 70 When a dispute arose, Graham, seeking 
to avoid arbitration, argued that the contract was an unen-
forceable contract of adhesion.71 In deciding the matter, the 
court first gave favorable deference to the Neal court's defini-
tion of adhesion contracts by stating that the definition has 
61 [d. 
62 [d. 
63 Friedmann, supra note 2, at 45. 
64 [d. 
65 Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784. 
66 [d. (finding that although in contracts of adhesion ambiguities should be inter-
preted against the drafting party, in the case at bar no ambiguities existed in the dis-
puted contract). 
67 See Neal, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 784, cited in Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 17l. 
68 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 167. 
69 [d. 
70 [d. at 168. 
7l [d. at 170. 
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"stood the test of time and will bear little improvement. "72 The 
court then commented on the public policy reasons for provid-
ing special consideration to adhesion contracts, similar to those 
outlined by the Neal court: "[sluch contracts are, of course, a 
familiar part of the modern legal landscape, in which the clas-
sical model of 'free' contracting by parties of equal or near-
equal bargaining strength is often found to be unresponsive to 
the realities brought about by increasing concentrations of eco-
nomic and other power."73 
It is noteworthy to mention that the Scissor-Tail court 
found certain advantages to adhesion contracts.74 One distinct 
advantage the court cited is that of uniformity.75 By treating 
all its customers with the same "standard and fIxed" manner, a 
company can act with greater "efficiency, simplicity, and stabil-
ity.''76 Such savings are substantial when adhesion contracts 
are widely used.77 Further, adhesion contracts put services 
within the reach of mass markets of consumers.78 If contrac-
tual relationships had to be individualized, mass distribution 
would be impossible.79 Finally, the court noted that adhesion 
contracts benefIt consumers by reducing transactional costs 
and thereby reducing the price of consumer goods.80 
Despite the benefIt adhesion contracts have on product 
price and availability, the Scissor-Tail court cautioned that 
adhesion contracts "bear with them the clear danger of oppres-
sion and overreaching."81 The court concluded that, due to this 
tension between the social advantages of adhesion contracts on 
the one hand and the danger of oppression on the other, judi-
cial and legislative actions were sometimes required to prevent 
perceived abuses.82 
Finally, after detailing the concerns regarding adhesion 
contracts, the Scissor-Tail court turned to the facts of the case. 
72 Id. at 171. 
73 Id. 
74 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. 
75 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297-298. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. 
82 Id. 
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Despite Mr. Graham's pivotal role in the music industry,83 the 
court found that, for the purpose of the contract with Scissor-
Tail, he was reduced to a mere "adherent" with little or no bar-
gaining power.84 The court thus found the contract adhesive.85 
While adhesion contracts arise in a variety of areas, there 
are certain problematic clauses in adhesion contracts which are 
the subject of much litigation.86 Arbitration clauses are com-
mon provisions found in adhesion contracts.87 An arbitration 
clause is a provision in a contract which mandates that any 
disputes arising from the contract be settled through arbitra-
tion.88 Although an arbitration clause can appear in any con-
tract, it is typically contained in contracts drafted by busi-
nesses and presented to consumers on a take-it-or-Ieave-it ba-
sis.89 This can be especially frustrating to consumers because 
binding arbitration eliminates the consumers' right to litigate 
the disputed issue in a judicial proceeding.90 The result of forc-
ing consumers out of a court of law eliminates consumers' right 
to have their claim decided by a jury, increases the costs of 
sa Because of Graham's strong position in the music business, Scissor-Tail repre-
sents an atypical case. See Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 167. This comment focuses on 
protecting consumers from overreaching adhesion contracts. See infra notes 1 to 47 
and accompanying text. As a musical promoter, Graham cannot be labeled as a con-
sumer in the context of his contract with Scissor-Tail. Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 167. 
The case is here used to demonstrate the development of the definition of an "adhesion 
contract." Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. It is, however, questionable whether the same 
consumer protections contemplated by this comment should apply to non-consumers 
such as Graham. See infra notes 352 to 391 and accompanying text. 
84 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171-172. 
85 [d. at 172. 
86 [d. at 168 (placement of a binding arbitration provision into an adhesion con-
tract). 
87 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 809 (examining adhesion contracts with respect to 
disputes arising under the Truth in Lending Act). 
88 See Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 168. Arbitration is defined as follows: "A method 
of dispute resolution involving one or more neutral third parties who are [usually] 
agreed to by the disputing parties and whose decision is binding." BLACKS LAw 
DICTIONARY 100 (7th Ed. 1999). 
89 See generally Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 168; Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute 
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 Hous. L. Rev. 
1237, 1240 (2001), cited in Schwartz, supra note 16, at 822. 
90 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 809. 
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pursuing a claim,91 and eliminates the possibility of a class ac-
tion lawsuit.92 
Without the ability to join forces with a multitude of simi-
larly injured plaintiffs, many lawsuits are not pursued.93 The 
reason for this is economic.94 For example, a claimant with a 
$100 claim is unlikely to pursue an individual action outside of 
small claims court.95 The attorney's fees and court costs re-
quired to settle such a dispute prohibit bringing the claim.96 If, 
however, the same claimant joined in a class with 10,000 simi-
larly injured parties, the suit would be feasible. 97 Conse-
quently, taking away the right to bring a class action often 
lessens the likelihood that the party will bring suit. 98 As a re-
sult, companies that impose class action bars are able to con-
tinue wrongful conduct without the threat of judicial interven-
tion.99 
B. CHALLENGING ADHESION CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA 
If a court determines that a contract is adhesive, the court 
must then decide whether to enforce the contract.lOO Some 
commentators argue that once a contract is found to be adhe-
91 Alderman, supra note 89, at 1240-1241 (stating that while small claims court 
costs may be as low as $100, arbitration costs can typically run upwards of $1,000, per 
day). 
92 See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1133; Alderman, supra note 89. "Class action" is defined 
as follows: "A lawsuit in which a single person or a small group of people represent the 
interests of a larger group. Federal procedure has several requirements for maintain-
ing a class action: (1) the class must be so large that individual suits would be imprac-
ticable, (2) there must be legal or factual questions common to the class, (3) the claims 
or defenses of the representative parties must be typical of those of the class, and (4) 
the representative parties must adequately protect the interests of the class." BLACKS 
LAw DICTIONARY 243 (7th Ed. 1999). 
93 See Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d Cir. 2000), cited in 
Schwartz, supra note 16, at 814-815. Johnson sought to enforce an $88 claim against 
the defendant, W. Suburban Bank. Johnson, 225 F.3d at 369-70, cited in Schwartz, 
supra note 16, at 814. Johnson filed as representative in a putative class action law-
suit. See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 814-15. Suburban Bank successfully enforced a 
mandatory arbitration provision, taking away Johnson's right to bring a class action. 
Id. at 818. Unable to maintain his class action, Johnson's ability to pursue his claim 
became "bleak." Id. 
94 See Alderman, supra note 89, at 1242. 
95Id. 
96 Id. 
97 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 827. 
98Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 172. 
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sive, it should be considered presumptively unenforceable. lol 
California courts have not adopted such an extreme ap-
proach. lo2 In California, a determination that a contract is ad-
hesive is merely the first step that courts take in deciding 
whether to enforce such contracts: "[t]o describe a contract as 
adhesive in character is not to indicate its legal effect. It is, 
rather, 'the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as 
enforceability of its terms is concerned.'"103 The Scissor-Tail 
court stated that adhesion contracts are fully enforceable 
"unless certain other factors are present which, under estab-
lished legal rules-legislative or judicial-operate to render it 
otherwise."104 California courts consider two factors in deter-
mining the enforceability of adhesion contracts: (1) whether the 
contract or provision falls within the "reasonable expectations" 
of the consumer; and (2) whether the contract or provision is 
considered unconscionable. 105 
1. Challenging an Adhesion Contract as Outside a Party's 
Reasonable Expectations 
The California Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
whether a contractual term was outside a party's reasonable 
expectations in Allan v. Snow Summit, Inc. l06 In Allan, the 
plaintiff claimed that the contract he signed with the defendant 
contained provisions which were outside his reasonable expec-
tations. lo7 The plaintiff, Allan, sued for back injuries allegedly 
sustained during a ski lesson provided by the defendant, Snow 
Summit. lOS Allan had signed a contract containing a liability 
release prior to taking the ski lesson.lo9 Allan argued, however, 
that the release was an unenforceable adhesion contract. 110 
The court ruled against Allan as to his reasonable expectations 
101 See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
Harv. L. Rev. 1173, 1176 (1983). 
102 See Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d at 172-73. 
103 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783, quoted in Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 172. 
104 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 172. 
105Id. 
106 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
107Id. 
108 Id. at 816. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 824. 
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argument.1l1 The court held that the factors that affect 
whether a contract is within the reasonable expectations of the 
adhering party include "notice and the extent to which the con-
tract affects the public interest."112 The court found that since 
the liability-release provisions were prominent and printed in 
large bold type, Allan had constructive notice of the provi-
sions.113 The court concluded that Allan looked at the contract 
at least long enough to write in his name and signatureY4 Ac-
cordingly, the contract determined to be within Allan's reason-
able expectations.115 The court put forth the general rule that 
complaining parties to a contract cannot assert ·that they were 
not given notice when they specifically chose not to read the 
contract. 116 
The issue of reasonable expectations was also addressed by 
the Scissor-Tail court.1l7 In Scissor-Tail, the court concluded 
that the mandatory arbitration provision that appeared in 
Graham's contract was not outside his reasonable expectations 
because Graham had been a party to thousands of similar 
agreements, including fifteen with the defendant Scissor-Tail. 118 
Therefore, the court ultimately found the challenged arbitra-
tion provision to be within Graham's reasonable expectations.119 
Requiring that an adhesion contract fall within a party's 
reasonable expectations is similar to the requirement of good 
faith to which all contracts must adhere. 12o The Restatement of 
Contracts provides, "[e]very contract imposes upon each party a 
duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement."121 The term "good faith" is somewhat vague and 
varies depending upon its context. 122 In the context of perform-
ance or enforcement of a contract, good faith encompasses 
111 [d. 
112 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
113 [d. 
114 [d. at 824. 
115 [d. at 825. 
116 [d. at 824 ("It is well established, in the absence of fraud, overreaching or 
excusable neglect, that one who signs an instrument may not avoid the impact of its 
terms on the ground that he failed to read the instrument before signing it.") 
117 Scissor.Tail, 623 P.2d at 173. 
118 [d. 
119 [d. 
120 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
121 [d. 
122 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205, cmt. a. 
12
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"faithfulness to an agreed common purpose" and "consistency 
with the justified expectations of the other party."l23 A contract 
in "bad faith" violates the reasonable expectations of the other 
party.l24 
2. Challenging an Adhesion Contract Based on the Doctrine 
of Unconscionability 
Courts will also consider whether an adhesive contract is 
unconscionable. l25 The California Civil Code provides that 
courts may refuse to enforce contracts or contractual provisions 
found unconscionable. l26 The doctrine of unconscionability is 
grounded in the principals of equity.l27 The doctrine is used to 
strike contracts that are unduly oppressive. l28 The Allan court 
applied the unconscionability doctrine, holding that "uncon-
scionability has generally been recognized to include an ab-
sence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties to-
gether with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable 
to the other party .... Phrased another way, unconscionability 
has both a 'procedural' and 'substantive' element."l29 Proce-
dural unconscionability focuses on oppression and surprise. l30 
"'Oppression' arises from an inequality of bargaining power 
which results in no real negotiation and 'an absence of mean-
ingful choice .... ' 'Surprise' involves the extent to which the sup-
posedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain are hidden in a prolix 
printed form drafted by the party seeking to enforce the dis-
puted terms."131 On the other hand, substantive unconscion-
ability arises where contractual terms are "overly harsh or one-
sided."l32 Thus, while procedural unconscionability is con-
cerned with the element of unfair surprise, substantive uncon-
123 [d. 
124 See [d. 
125 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 173. 
126 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.5 (Deering 2004). 
127 See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
128 [d. 
129 A&M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 121 (1982), cited in Allan, 
59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825. 
130 [d. 
131 A&M Produce Co., 186 Cal. Rptr. at 122, cited in Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
825. 
132 Flores v. Transamerica Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 381 (Cal. Ct. 
App.2001). 
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scionability deals with contracts or contractual provisions 
which are so unfair that they shock the conscience.133 
In California, in order to prevail on an unconscionability 
claim, the complaining party must demonstrate that the con-
tract is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.134 
These elements need not, however, be present in the same de-
gree. l35 California courts apply a "sliding scale,"136 wherein the 
more substantive unconscionability that exists in a contract, 
the less procedural unconscionability the court will require be-
fore refusing to enforce the contract or contractual provision, 
and vice versa. 137 To prove unconscionability, a party must, 
however, make at least some showing of both procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.13s 
The process of determining whether a contract is uncon-
scionable is directly linked to a determination that the contract 
is adhesive. 139 In California, when a contract is found to be ad-
hesive that contract is considered procedurally unconscion-
able. 140 In Ting u. AT&T, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
interpreting California law, affirmed this principap41 The 
court succinctly stated, "a contract is procedurally unconscion-
able if it is a contract of adhesion."142 
The Ting case involved AT&T customers who challenged a 
mandatory arbitration provision included in a form contract 
that was mailed to millions of customers.143 The court found 
133 See Id. 
134 Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 146 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997), cited 
in Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 ("The prevailing view is that [procedural and substantive 
unconscionability) must both be present in order for the court to exercise its discretion 
to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability. "); See 
also Circuit City v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2002) (interpreting California 
law). 
135 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
136 Id.; See also Soltani v. W. & S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 
2001) (interpreting California law). 
137 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
138 See Id. 
139 Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 ("A finding of a contract of adhesion is essen-
tially a finding of procedural unconscionability."). 
140 See generally Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 ("the undisputed facts indicate 
that the arbitration agreement was imposed upon plaintiffs on a 'take it or leave it' 
basis. The arbitration agreement was a contract of adhesion and thereby procedurally 
unconscionable."); see also 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12j[c). 
141 Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148. 
142Id. 
143 Id. at 1134. 
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that few of the phone service customers were likely to have 
read the contract. 144 The contract provided that the customers 
would accept its terms by simply continuing to use the carrier's 
services.145 Thus, the Ninth Circuit found that the contract had 
been offered on a "take-it-or-Ieave-it basis" and was, therefore, 
procedurally unconscionable. 146 
C. DEALING WITH ADHESION CONTRACTS IN JURISDICTIONS 
OUTSIDE OF CALIFORNIA 
Not all jurisdictions agree with California's approach of 
equating contracts of adhesion with procedural unconscionabil-
ity.147 In Hutcherson u. Sears Roebuck & Co, the Illinois Court 
of Appeals upheld an amendment to a credit card contract 
against a consumer, despite the contract's adhesive nature.148 
The defendant credit card company sent the disputed amend-
ment to its customers along with a letter stating that custom-
ers could reject the agreement by sending a notice of rejection 
to the company.149 If the customers rejected the agreement, 
they would not be able to make additional purchases on their 
credit cards.150 The Hutcherson court found that: (1) the plain-
tiffs had ample notice that their agreements were subject to 
amendment; (2) the company sent notice of the agreement to 
the plaintiffs; and (3) that the arbitration provision was placed 
in a conspicuous paragraph printed in capital letters.151 The 
court, therefore, found no procedural unconscionability and 
enforced the amendment. 152 
Other courts have followed this logic of separating the de-
termination of procedural unconscionability from the determi-
nation of whether a contract is adhesive.153 In Bank One, N.A 
u. Coates, the Southern District Court of Mississippi found that 
144 [d. 
145 [d. 
146 [d. at 1149. 
147 See Hutcherson u. Sears Roebuck & Co., 793 N.E.2d 886, 893 (ill. App. Ct. 
2003). 
148 [d. at 900. 
149 [d. at 888. 
ISO [d. 
151 [d. at 894. 
152 [d. It should be noted, however, that the court made no explicit finding as to 
whether the contract was adhesive. [d. 
153 See Bank One, N.A v. Coates, 125 F. Supp. 2d 819 (S.D. Miss. 2001). 
15
Sterkin: Challenging Adhesion Contracts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
300 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
an amendment to a credit card contract that required disputes 
to be settled through mandatory arbitration was not proce-
durally unconscionable.l54 The court found that a mandatory 
arbitration provision in the amended contract was both clear 
and free from "legalese."l55 Though the Bank One court did not 
specifically address the issue of whether the contract was ad-
hesive, the Bank had offered the contract to consumers with no 
room for negotiations. l56 The Bank One consumers could either 
accept the contract through performance, or reject the agree-
ment. l57 Nevertheless, the court determined the contract was 
not procedurally unconscionable. l5s 
The United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Alabama faced a similar fact pattern in Stiles v. Home Cable 
Concepts,Inc. l59 In Stiles, a credit company sought to arbitrate 
against a debtor based on a mandatory arbitration provision in 
an amended version of the debtor's contract.l60 Again, similar 
to Bank One, the amendment was presented on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis, with no opportunity to negotiate the terms.l6l 
The Stiles court did not make an explicit finding as to whether 
the amendment was an adhesion contract. l62 The court, how-
ever, implied that the contract was adhesive by stating, "Stiles 
was given a clear choice in this case; he could take the arbitra-
tion provision or leave it."l63 Despite this language, the court 
ruled that the amendment was not unconscionable. l64 
The courts in Hutcherson, Bank One, and Stiles dealt with 
contracts offered on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis;l65 nevertheless, 
these courts found no procedural unconscionability in the con-
tracts. l66 Thus, the California approach of automatically con-
154 [d. at 83l. 
155 [d. at 833. 
156 [d. at 83l. 
157 [d. 
156 [d. at 833-834. 
159 Stiles v. Home Cable Concepts, Inc., 994 F.Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala. 1998). 
160 [d. at 1412-13. 
161 [d. 
162 [d. at 1417 (examining whether the contract was unconscionable, outside the 
context of an adhesion contract). 
163 [d. at 1418. 
164 [d. 
165 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 894; Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 833-834; Stiles, 
994 F.Supp. at 1418. 
166 [d. 
16
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sidering adhesive contracts procedurally unconscionable is not 
practiced by all jurisdictions. 167 
II. A PRACTICAL EXAMINATION OF THE CALIFORNIA SYSTEM 
FOR DEALING WITH ADHESION CONTRACTS: WHAT 
FACTORS WILL COURTS CONSIDER 
California attorneys and consumers must know exactly 
what it takes to challenge an adhesion contract in California. 
The case law demonstrates that there are two ways to attack 
an adhesion contract: (1) show that the contractual term is out-
side the adherent's reasonable expectations;168 or (2) show that 
the contract provision is unconscionable. 169 Thus, the first 
question is: What showing is required before courts will con-
sider a contract adhesive? Second, what showing is required 
before the courts will determine that a contract provision is 
either outside a party's reasonable expectations or unconscion-
able? The best way to discern when these standards are 
deemed satisfied is to examine cases dealing with these issues. 
A. WHAT CALIFORNIA COURTS REQUIRE IN ORDER To FIND A 
CONTRACT ADHESIVE 
While practitioners may understand the definition of an 
adhesion contract in theory, the actual practice of identifying 
adhesion contracts may not be so simple. Courts consider such 
factors as: the relative bargaining powers of the parties, 
whether the adhering party was free to negotiate for alteration 
of the printed terms of the agreement, and the availability of 
the product or services from other sources yo Often, adhesion 
contracts present situations where the weaker party not only 
lacks bargaining power, but also lacks a realistic opportunity to 
seek services elsewhere. l7l Hospital admission forms present a 
classic example of such contracts.172 
167 Id., contra Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
168 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
169Id. 
170 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12j(c]. 
171 Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 552 P.2d at 1185-186 (Cal. 1976). 
172 Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 261, 266 (Cal. Ct. 
App.1997). 
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In Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hospital, the California Court of 
Appeals examined a contract contained in a form presented to a 
patient upon admission to a hospital.173 David Wheeler was 
admitted to St. Joseph Hospital so that tests could be run on 
his heart.174 After the tests were performed, Wheeler suffered a 
brain injury that rendered him a total quadriplegic.175 He could 
not speak. and could only communicate by moving his eyes.176 
Wheeler and his wife filed suit against St. Joseph seeking 
damages for malpractice.177 
In response to the complaint, St. Joseph filed a petition to 
compel arbitration.17s St. Joseph's petition alleged that on the 
evening he was admitted to the hospital, Wheeler signed a form 
entitled, "Conditions of Admission."179 This "Conditions of Ad-
mission" form comprised several numbered paragraphs con-
tained on the bottom half of the admission form used by the 
hospital. 180 The top half of the· form was used for the insertion 
of statistical information concerning the patient.1Sl Included in 
the "Conditions of Admission" was a paragraph entitled "Arbi-
tration Option."182 The "Arbitration Option" paragraph man-
dated that any claims against the hospital or its doctors were 
to be settled by arbitration at the option of any of the contract-
ing parties. 183 The "Conditions of Admission" form provided 
that if the patient did not agree with the "Arbitration Option," 
he could place his initials in a space provided on the form or, 
173 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 778. 
174 [d. 
175 [d. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. 
178 [d. 
179 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 778-79. 
180 [d. at 779 n.2. 
181 [d. at 778-79 
182 [d. at 779 n.2. 
183 [d. The arbitration provision provided in full: 
Arbitration Option: Any legal claim or civil action in connection with this hospi-
talization, by or against hospital or its employees or any doctor of medicine agree-
ing in writing to be bound by this provision, shall be settled by arbitration at the 
option of any party bound by this document in accordance with the Commercial 
Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association and with the Hospital 
Arbitration Regulations of the California Hospital Association (copies available on 
request at the hospital admission office), unless patient or undersigned initials be-
low or sends a written communication to the contrary to the hospital within thirty 
(30) days of the date of patient discharge. [d. 
18
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alternatively, notify the hospital of his disagreement with the 
"Arbitration Option" within thirty days of his discharge. 184 
Wheeler did neither.18s 
Wheeler's wife, suing on Wheeler's behalf, claimed the 
agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable. 186 Wheeler's wife 
claimed that: (1) her husband signed the admission form with-
out reading it; (2) that no one at the hospital called their atten-
tion to the "Arbitration Option;" (3) that neither she nor her 
husband were aware of the existence of the "Arbitration Op-
tion;" (4) that a copy of the form was never provided; and (5) 
that she did not learn of the existence of the "Arbitration Op-
tion" until St. Joseph moved to compel arbitration.187 The court 
ruled that the St. Joseph hospital admission form possessed 
"all the characteristics of a contract of adhesion."188 
[The] would-be patient is in no position to reject the proffered 
agreement, to bargain with the hospital, or in lieu of agree-
ment to find another hospital. The admission room of a hos-
pital contains no bargaining table where, as in a private busi-
ness transaction, the parties can debate the terms of their 
contract. 189 
Subsequently, the court found the "Conditions of Admission" 
used by St. Joseph's hospital to be an unenforceable contract of 
adhesion.190 
Conversely, in Powers v. Dickson, Carlson & Campillo, the 
California Court of Appeals examined an attorney-retainer 
agreement and found the contract was not adhesive.19l In this 
case, Mr. and Mrs. Powers had purchased a $2 million luxury 
home in Pacific Palisades and were represented in the pur-
chase by their original attorney, Roy Glickman.192 Soon after 
moving in to their home, the Powerses become aware of struc-
184 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 779. 
185 [d. 
185 [d. at 780. 
187 [d. 
188 [d. at 783. 
189 Tunkl v. Regents of University of California, 383 P.2d 441, 447 (Cal. 1963), 
cited in Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783. 
190 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 783,793-94. 
191 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
192 [d. at 263. 
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tural defects in the home. 193 The Powerses retained Glickman 
to settle the ensuing arbitration with the seller/developer of the 
home.194 The Powerses thereafter became dissatisfied with 
Glickman's performance. 195 The Powerses then contacted 
Nicholas Toghia and retained him for representation in the 
construction defects arbitration. 196 The retainer agreement 
contained 12 numbered paragraphs.197 Paragraph Ten provided 
that any disputes related to attorney's fees, the retainer con-
tract, or the attorney's professional services were to be submit-
ted to binding arbitration. 198 A little more than a year into the 
contract, the Powerses became concerned over the amount of 
money Toghia's services were costing.199 The Powerses subse-
quently amended their contract from an hourly rate to a flat 
fee. 20o This amendment contained seven numbered para-
graphs.201 Paragraph Six again provided that disputes relating 
to the agreement were to be resolved through binding arbitra-
tion.202 
193 [d. 
194 [d. 
195 [d. 
196 [d. 
197 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263. 
198 [d. The provision provided in full: 
10. Binding Arbitration. The parties hereto agree that any dispute relating to At-
torney's fees under this Contract shall be submitted to binding arbitration before 
the Los Angeles County Bar Association pursuant to California Business and Pro-
fessions Code Section 6200, et seq., or, should that organization decline to arbi-
trate the dispute, before the State Bar of California pursuant to California Busi-
ness and Professions Code Section 6200, et seq. Any other dispute (other than At-
torney's fees) between the parties hereto arising out of or relating to this Contract 
or Attorney's professional services rendered to or for Client, shall be resolved by 
binding arbitration before the American Arbitration Association in Los Angeles, 
California, in accordance with the Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration 
Association prevailing at the time ofthe arbitration. [d. 
199 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. 
202 [d. This provision provided in full: 
6. Arbitration. If any dispute arises out of, or related to, a claimed breach of this 
agreement, the professional services rendered by Toghia, or Clients' failure to pay 
fees for professional services and other expenses specified, or any other disagree-
ment of any nature, type or description regardless of the facts or the legal theories 
which may be involved, such dispute shall be resolved by arbitration before the 
American Arbitration Association by a single arbitrator in accordance with the 
Commercial Rules of the American Arbitration [Associationl in effect [atl the time 
the proceeding is initiated. The hearings shall be held in the Los Angeles offices of 
20
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The original arbitration with the seller/developer, for 
which the Powerses had retained Toghia, was later suspended 
because the parties failed to initial the purchase agreement's 
general arbitration provision.203 After the breakdown of the 
arbitration with the seller/developer, the Powerses sued Toghia 
for legal malpractice, alleging negligence in pursuing arbitra-
tion against the seller/developer when the arbitration provision 
in the purchase agreement was invalid.204 Further, the Pow-
erses alleged that Toghia had caused them to incur unneces-
sary attorneys' fees. 205 
Toghia petitioned the trial court to compel arbitration of 
the Powerses' legal malpractice claim.206 The trial court denied 
the petition to compel arbitration.207 The California Court of 
Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court, finding the arbi-
tration provision valid and enforceable.208 In its ruling, the 
California Court of Appeals considered the enforceability of 
mandatory arbitration provisions contained within adhesion 
contracts.209 The court pointed out that, "[a]n arbitration provi-
sion in an adhesion contract is legally enforceable unless the 
provision (1) does not fall within the reasonable expectations of 
the weaker party, or (2) is unduly oppressive or unconSClOn-
able."210 
Where an arbitration. provision is included in a contract of 
adhesion, '[t]he law ought not to decree a forfeiture of such a 
valuable right where the [weaker party] has not been made 
aware of the existence of an arbitration provision or its impli-
cations. Absent notification and at least some explanation, 
the American Arbitration Association and each side shall bear his/their own costs 
and attorney fees. [d. at 264. 
203 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 264. 
204 [d. 
205 [d. 
206 [d. 
207 [d. The trial court found that the arbitration clauses in both the original and 
amended agreements were not printed in bold type, that the provisions were contained 
at the end of the document, that the Powerses were not encouraged to seek the advice 
of independent counsel, and that Toghia did not specifically inform them that, by sign-
ing, they were waiving important rights; namely, the right to a jury trial. Id. Accord-
ingly, the trial court ruled that a lack of informed consent to the arbitration provisions 
existed. Id. 
208 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 269. 
209 [d. at 265-66. 
210 [d. at 265. 
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the [weaker party] cannot be said to have exercised a 'real 
choice' in selecting arbitration over litigation '" .'211 [C]ourts 
will not enforce provisions in adhesion contracts which limit 
the duties or liability of the stronger party unless such provi-
sions are 'conspicuous, plain and clear' and will not operate to 
defeat the reasonable expectations of the parties.212 
The court went on to consider whether the agreement be-
tween the Powerses and Toghia was an adhesion contract.213 
The Powers court defined the term "adhesion contract" with the 
now familiar definition adopted by the Neal court.214 The court 
pointed to the hospital admission form used in Wheeler as a 
prime example of an adhesion contract because "a patient being 
admitted to a hospital is in no position to debate his or her 
terms of admission. "215 The court stated that without any real-
istic bargaining power, a patient is forced to either accept the 
terms of a hospital admission form, or forego the needed ser-
vice.216 The court, however, found that the retainer agreement 
and subsequent amendment that the Powerses entered into 
with Toghia differed from the hospital admission form signed 
by Wheeler.217 
The court found that the contract and the amendment en-
tered into by the Powerses and Toghia were not contracts of 
adhesion.218 The agreements were not standardized contracts 
presented on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis.219 The contract and the 
amendment were "negotiated and individualized agreements. 
The Powerses possessed the freedom to employ the attorney of 
their choice and bargain for the terms of their choice."220 Fi-
nally, the court stated that, "[t]he Powers' decision to change 
legal counsel and their successful renegotiation of the terms of 
211 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 786, cited in Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. 
212 Madden, 552 P.2d at 1185, cited in Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. 
213 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
214 [zzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 318 (1986), cited in Powers, 
63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. ("A contract of adhesion has been defined as a 'standardized 
contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, 
relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or 
reject it.") 
215 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. 
216 [d. 
217 [d. 
218 [d. 
219 [d. 
220 [d. 
22
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their fee arrangement with Attorney Toghia demonstrate that 
they possessed substantial bargaining strength."221 
Much insight can be gained by comparing the case of 
Wheeler, where the court found a contract of adhesion existed, 
and the case of Powers, where the court found no contract of 
adhesion existed. The contrast of these two cases demonstrates 
the relevant factors which a court considers when deciding 
whether a contract is adhesive:222 namely, the relative bargain-
ing powers of the parties, whether the adhering party was free 
to negotiate for alteration of the printed terms of the agree-
ment, and the availability of the product or services from other 
sources.223 
1. Examining the Relative Bargaining Powers of the Parties 
in Order to Determine Whether a Contract is Adhesive 
The bargaining power of the contracting parties in Wheeler 
differed greatly from the bargaining power between the parties 
in Powers.224 Wheeler had no bargaining power whatsoever.225 
He was a patient with a failing heart entering a hospitaU26 He 
was in no position to haggle over terms and conditions.227 On 
the other hand, the Powerses entered the bargaining table with 
Toghia on relatively equal footing.228 Unhappy over the per-
formance of one attorney, the Powerses sought another attor-
ney.229 Toghia may have been more familiar with the terms of 
his contract, as he had likely entered into similar contracts 
with previous clients.23o Further, Toghia may have been in a 
better position to understand the terms and conditions of the 
contract because he was an attorney.231 Nevertheless, these 
factors did not remove bargaining power from the Powerses.232 
As potential legal clients, the Powerses were in a position to 
221 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265. 
222 See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783-85; Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265-66. 
223 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12][c]. 
224 See Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d 784; Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
225 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 784. 
226 ld. at 778. 
227 ld. at 783. 
228 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
229 ld. at 263. 
230 Seeld. 
231Id. 
232 ld. at 266. 
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negotiate the terms of the contract with Toghia.233 This power 
of negotiation can be seen by the later amendment to the origi-
nal agreement: once the Powerses became dissatisfied with 
their hourly fee arrangement with Toghia, they reentered the 
bargaining process and renegotiated their contract.234 This 
demonstrated the Powerses' ability to contract on equal footing 
with Toghia.235 In Wheeler, where there was a great imbalance 
of bargaining power, the court determined the contract to be 
adhesive.236 In Powers, where the parties entered the negotia-
tion process on equal footing, the court declined to find the con-
tract adhesive.237 
2. Examining the Freedom to Negotiate Terms in Order to 
Determine Whether a Contract is Adhesive 
The next factor to consider is whether the parties challeng-
ing the contract were free to negotiate the terms of their 
agreement.238 The hospital presented a contract to Wheeler on 
a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis.239 While Wheeler could have opted 
out of the "Arbitration Option" by initialing the contract in the 
proper place or by sending timely notice after discharge, the 
contract, as a whole, was not open for negotiation.240 Had 
Wheeler objected to certain terms or sought to alter the con-
tract, it was unlikely that St. Joseph would have complied.241 
Further, it is doubtful that St. Joseph had qualified persons on 
hand to negotiate a contract.242 Had Wheeler objected to the 
contract as presented, it is unlikely he would have been pro-
vided medical services.243 Wheeler's inability to negotiate the 
terms of his contract led to a determination that the contract 
was adhesive.244 
233 Id. 
234 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
235 Id. 
236 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 784. 
237 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
238 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12][c]. 
239 See Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 783-84. 
240 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 778-779. 
241 See [d. 
242 See [d. 
243 See [d. 
244 See [d. 
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On the other hand, the Powerses were fully capable of ne-
gotiating terms with Toghia when they contracted with him.245 
The court specifically found that the Powerses' agreement was 
"negotiated and individualized. "246 Toghia likely entered many 
retainer agreements with similar terms.247 As an attorney, he 
was fully capable of altering the agreement had the Powerses 
wanted specific changes.248 The ability of the Powerses to nego-
tiate their deal with Toghia negated any claim that the con-
tract was adhesive.249 
3. Examining the Availability of the Product or Service from 
Other Sources 
The final factor to consider is whether the product or ser-
vice sought in the contract was available from other sources.250 
The Wheeler court found that a patient who is dissatisfied with 
an admission contract is in no position to search for another 
hospital which admits patients under more favorable terms.251 
While it is possible that Wheeler could have sought medical 
services elsewhere, it is unreasonable to require sick or dying 
patients to shop around for hospitals based on terms of admis-
sion.252 Patients choose hospitals based on a wide variety of 
factors, including medical specialties, location, and reputa-
tion-not contractual terms on admission forms.253 On the con-
trary, persons entering into an attorney/client relationship are 
more likely to shop around for a favorable retainer agree-
ment.254 Further, should potential clients spot a provision in a 
retainer agreement that is unfavorable, they are in a much bet-
ter position to walk out of the attorney's office and seek repre-
sentation elsewhere, as was the case in Powers.255 The Pow-
erses sought Toghia's assistance only after becoming dissatis-
245 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
246 [d. 
247 [d. at 263. 
248 [d. 
249 [d. at 266. 
250 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12][c]. 
251 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 783. 
252 [d. 
253 See [d. 
254 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 263. 
255 [d. 
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fied with the performance of Glickman, their first attorney. 256 
Powerses had the ability to obtain services elsewhere;257 
Wheeler did not.258 This difference further demonstrates why 
Wheeler's contract was ruled adhesive, and the Powerses' con-
tract was not.259 
These two cases, Wheeler and Powers, demonstrate the fac-
tors that a party must prove before a contract will be deter-
mined to be adhesive.260 It is not enough merely to show that 
an agreement is presented in a standardized form. 261 For a con-
tract to be declared adhesive, a party must demonstrate that 
there was no real ability to negotiate and that the drafting 
party imposed its predetermined terms upon the adherent.262 
Where a party is in a position to bargain, or can easily seek the 
product or services elsewhere, or not contract at all, it is 
unlikely that a court will find a contract adhesive.263 
B. PRACTICAL METHODS FOR CHALLENGING ADHESION 
CONTRACTS IN CALIFORNIA 
There are two ways to challenge a contract of adhesion or 
the provisions therein.264 Challengers may either argue that a 
contract or contractual provision is outside their reasonable 
expectations, or that the contract or its provisions are uncon-
scionable.265 The question becomes: What must challengers 
show in order to do this? 
1. Showing Necessary in Order for California Courts to De-
termine that a Contract or Contractual Term is Outside a 
Party's Reasonable Expectations 
In Allan, the California Supreme Court considered 
whether a release of liability provision was outside a party's 
256 Id. 
257Id. 
258 Wheeler, 63 Cal. App. 3d at 783. 
259 Id.; Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
260 See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783-85; Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 265-66. 
261 13 MB, Contracts Section 140.32[12)[c]. 
262 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 783. 
263 Powers, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 266. 
264 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
265 Id. 
26
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reasonable expectations.266 In making its determination, the 
court considered notice and the extent to which the contract 
affects the public interest.267 In finding the provision within the 
plaintiffs reasonable expectations, the Allan court noted that 
that provision was prominently displayed in large bold type.266 
The court was not persuaded by the argument that Allan had 
not actually read the provision. 269 The Allan court enforced the 
provision based on constructive notice, due to the conspicuous 
placement of the provision in the contract.270 There are, how-
ever, some types of contracts for which the courts require ac-
tual notice.271 
When dealing with adhesive insurance polices, courts ex-
hibit no tolerance for lack of notice.272 In Jones v. Crown Life 
Ins. Co., a father was issued a life insurance policy through his 
employer. 273 The father named his minor child, Jones, as the 
beneficiary on the policy.274 Subsequently, the father was killed 
in an auto accident.275 The insurance company claimed the ac-
cident resulted from the father's own intoxication while driv-
ing.276 Language in the policy excluded recovery based on acci-
dental death if the death was caused by the insured's criminal 
offense.277 In seeking recovery, Jones sought to have the exclu-
sionary language declared an unenforceable provision in an 
adhesion contract.278 
The Jones court found the contract to be adhesive because 
it was presented to Jones's father without the opportunity to 
negotiate.279 The court went on to hold that in adhesive insur-
ance contracts, a party's notice of exclusionary language must 
be explicit.280 The court held that where a party to an adhesive 
266 [d. 
267 [d. 
268 [d. 
269 [d. 
270 See [d. 
271 See Jones v. Crown Life Ins. Co., 150 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978). 
272 [d. at 379. 
273 [d. at 376. 
274 [d. 
275 [d. at 377. 
276 [d. 
277 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 376. 
278 See [d. at 379. 
279 [d. at 378-79. 
260 [d. at 379. This rule is further evidenced by the court's approval of the follow-
ing jury instruction: "The insurance company ... must call to the insured's attention 
27
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insurance contract is unaware of exclusionary language con-
tained in the contract, that language will not be enforced.281 
Further, the court found that, in such contracts, all doubts as 
to the reasonable expectations of the insured are to be resolved 
against the insurance company.282 
For most contracts, conspicuous type will be enough for a 
court to impose constructive notice.283 When dealing with adhe-
sive insurance contracts, however, the bar is set somewhat 
higher.284 For adhesive insurance contracts, any exclusionary 
language must be called to the insured's attention and clearly 
explained/85 or it will not be enforced. 286 For exclusionary pro-
visions in adhesive insurance contracts, constructive notice 
does not suffice.287 
2. Showing Necessary in Order for California Courts to De-
termine a Contractual Term Unenforceable Due to Uncon-
scionability 
Another method of challenging adhesion contracts is to 
have the contract or contractual provision declared uncon-
scionable.288 In California, once a contract is declared adhesive, 
it is considered procedurally unconscionable. 289 For a contract 
or its provision to be declared unenforceable, however, there 
must be a showing of both procedural and substantive uncon-
scionability.290 While these elements need not be present in the 
same degree, both must be present. 291 Courts have adopted 
what is referred to as a "sliding scale."292 Based on this system, 
any exclusions from coverage; if this is not done, then the exclusion cannot be given 
effect so as to limit the reasonable expectations of coverage ofthe insured." Id. 
281 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
282Id. 
283 See Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
284 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
285 Logan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 41 Cal. App. 988, 995 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1919), cited in Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
286 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
287Id. 
288 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824; See Cal. Civ. Code Section 1670.5 (Deering 
2004). 
289 Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
290 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
291Id. 
292 Id. A strong showing of one aspect of unconscionability may cause a court to 
rule a contract unenforceable, despite a weaker showing of the other aspect of uncon-
scionability. Id. 
28
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the question becomes: Once a contract is determined to be ad-
hesive, and therefore procedurally unconscionable, how much 
substantive unconscionability must be shown in order for the 
contract to be declared unenforceable? 
In Soltani v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted, based on California law, 
two provisions in an employment contract.293 One provision 
shortened the statute of limitations upon which suits could be 
brought against the employer.294 The other provision required 
that ten days' written notice be provided to the employer before 
any suit could be filed. 295 Based on the posture of the case, the 
court presumed the adhesive nature of the employment con-
tract.296 The court then considered whether the provisions con-
tained elements of substantive unconscionability.297 
The Soltani court found that the provision which short-
ened the statute of limitations was not unconscionable.298 The 
court based its finding on the fact that a number of courts had 
upheld provisions in contracts which shortened the statute of 
limitations time period, including the United States Supreme 
Court, California courts, and courts in other jurisdictions.299 
The general thrust of these cases was that the stipulated stat-
ute of limitations must be reasonable.30o Thus, despite its will-
ingness to interpret the contract as adhesive, and therefore 
procedurally unconscionable, the Soltani court enforced the 
shortened statute of limitations based on a lack of substantive 
unconscionability.301 
As to the ten day notice provision, the Soltani court found 
no California case law addressing the issue of whether such a 
notice provision is substantively unconscionable.302 Conse-
293 Soltani v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1040 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
294 [d. at 104l. 
295 [d. 
296 [d. at 1043. 
297 [d. ("even if the contracts were adhesive, the court applies a sliding scale and 
must also examine the substantive prong"). The court cites, in its definition of sub-
stantive unconscionability, such factors as whether there is as "lack of mutuality" and 
whether the contractual provision is so "one-sided as to 'shock the conscience.'" [d. 
298 Soltani, 258 F.3d at 1043. 
299 [d. at 1043-44. 
300 [d. 
301 [d. at 1044. 
302 [d. at 1045. 
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quently, the court compared the provision to cases of substan-
tive unconscionability that the California Supreme Court had 
previouslyaddressed.303 Based on this assessment, the Soltani 
court found little justification for the notice provision.304 The 
court found that the provision would not afford the employer 
enough time to investigate suits, nor would it prevent state 
claims or further judicial economy.305 In fact, the court found 
the only purpose of the provision was to "maximize employer 
advantage" and to "bar any suits relating to the employer's 
agreement."306 As a result of the one-sided nature of this provi-
sion, the notice provision was found to be substantively uncon-
scionable and unenforceable.307 
This one case provides two excellent examples of how 
courts deal with substantive unconscionability.30B It is not 
enough for a party to an adhesion contract to show that a pro-
vision is unfavorable; provisions which courts typically enforce 
do not receive special consideration just because they are con-
tained in an adhesion contract.309 But, where a provision is 
one-sided and placed in the contract by the drafter for no other 
purpose than to gain an unfair advantage, the courts will con-
sider such provisions substantively unconscionable.310 When 
these substantively unconscionable provisions appear in adhe-
sion contracts, courts will not enforce the provisions.3ll 
303 [d. at 1046. 
304 Soltani, 258 F.3d at 1046. 
305 [d. "Judicial economy" is defined as follows: "Efficiency in the operation of the 
courts and the judicial system; esp., the efficient management of litigation so as to 
minimize duplication of effort and to avoid wasting the judiciary's time and resources." 
BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 851 (7th Ed. 1999). 
306 Soltani, 258 F.3d at 1047. 
307 [d. 
308 See [d. (enforcing the six month limitation period provision, but not the ten 
day written notice provision). 
309 [d. at 1044. 
310 [d. at 1047. 
311 [d. 
30
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III. COMPARING CALIFORNIA'S ADHESION CONTRACTS LAw 
WITH THE LAws IN JURISDICTIONS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA: 
DIFFERING TESTS, SAME RESULTS 
Several courts in jurisdictions outside California have en-
forced contracts which seem clearly adhesive.312 In looking at 
these cases, it is necessary to (A) examine what laws the courts 
outside California apply when faced with contracts that bear 
the characteristics of adhesion contracts; (B) determine if, un-
der these laws, there is any advantage to consumers in having 
oppressive contracts declared adhesive; (C) determine if there 
is a difference between an adhesion contract and one which is 
procedurally unconscionable; and (D) examine the effect of 
California's presumption that adhesion contracts are proce-
durally unconscionable. 
A. EXAMINATION OF A SYSTEM FOR DEALING WITH ADHESION 
CONTRACTS DIFFERING FROM THAT OF CALIFORNIA 
In Hutcherson u. Sears Roebuck & Co., the Appellate Court 
of Illinois applied Arizona law to uphold a mandatory arbitra-
tion provision in an amended credit card contract.SIS The credit 
card holders cited California law, arguing that the amended 
credit card contract was a contract of adhesion and, therefore, 
procedurally unconscionable per se.Sl4 The Hutcherson court 
cited a rule remarkably similar to the analysis found in Cali-
fornia.sls The court stated that finding a contract adhesive does 
not determine its enforceability.316 Enforceability is determined 
by examining the reasonable expectations of the adhering 
party, and deciding whether the contract is unconscionable.317 
312 Stiles, 994 F.Supp. at 1418 (finding that the contract was not unconscionable 
despite being offered on a take-it-or-Ieave-it basis); Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 834 
(enforcing a contractual provision despite its small print). 
313 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 888, 890, 894 (finding a lack of procedural uncon-
scionability under Arizona law). 
314 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893. Plaintiffs argue that, according to Flores, 113 
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382, and Ting, 319 F.3d at 1148, their contract, is procedurally uncon-
scionable per se, as it is a contract of adhesion. Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893. "Per 
se" is defined as follows: "Of, in, or by itself, standing alone, without reference to addi-
tional facts; .... As a matter oflaw." BLACKS LAw DICTIONARY 1162 (7th ed. 1999). 
315 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
316 [d. 
317 [d. 
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This statement of law is a close replica of the California 
analysis.3lB There is, however, one difference.319 Nowhere in 
Hutcherson does the court adopt the California approach of 
equating adhesion contracts with procedurally unconscionabil-
ity.320 Instead, while making no explicit determination as to 
whether the contract is adhesive, the court finds that the con-
tract is not procedurally unconscionable.321 In finding a lack of 
procedural unconscionability, the court notes that there was 
ample notice of the amendment, that the arbitration provision 
was contained in a conspicuous paragraph, and the card hold-
ers had the option of opting out of the amendment without 
causing their balances to become due.322 After further finding a 
total lack of substantive unconscionability, the court enforced 
the contract.323 
B. LITI'LE ADVANTAGE To CONSUMERS IN HAVING A 
CONTRACT DECLARED ADHESIVE 
In Hutcherson, the court, in enforcing the contract, made 
no explicit finding that the contract was adhesive.324 The lack 
of determination as to whether the contract was adhesive may 
have, however, been immaterial in deciding whether to enforce 
the contract.325 All contracts must contain elements of good 
faith.326 Similarly, courts do not enforce contracts found to be 
unconscionable.327 This is the case with all contracts, not just 
adhesion contracts.32B These are the same elements which Cali-
fornia courts say should be considered when dealing with adhe-
sion contracts:329 i.e., provisions should be in good faith-or 
318 Compare Id. (stating Arizona law) with Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 172-173 (stat-
ing California law). 
319Id. 
320 Compare Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94 with Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 
382 (stating California law). 
321 Id. at 894. 
322Id. 
323 Id. at 898, 900. 
324 Id. at 893-94. 
325 Id. 
326 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205. This theory of good faith en-
compasses the same concepts as whether a contract is within a party's reasonable 
expectations. See Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
327 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 173. 
328 Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205. 
329 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 172-73. 
32
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol34/iss2/3
2004] CHALLENGING ADHESION CONTRACTS 317 
within a party's reasonable expectations-and be free from un-
conscionability.330 
As a result, in jurisdictions following the Hutcherson ap-
proach there may be little use in showing that a contract is ad-
hesive.33l As the same limitations which are used to reign in 
adhesion contracts apply to all contracts, the only advantage 
which may be gained by proving that a contract is adhesive is 
that, under California law, adhesive contracts are considered 
procedurally unconscionable.332 This, too, however, may be an 
advantage immaterial to consumers. 
C. No REAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PROCEDURALLY 
UNCONSCIONABLE CONTRACTS AND CONTRACTS OF 
ADHESION 
The only identified advantage to having a contract de-
clared adhesive is that California considers adhesion contracts 
procedurally unconscionable.333 But even without this explicit 
presumption, in practice, there is little difference between an 
adhesion contract and one which is procedurally unconscion-
able. The concern with both procedural unconscionable con-
tracts and contracts of adhesion is that there is an absence of a 
meaningful choice.334 Both doctrines seek to give relief to par-
ties who are "excusably ignorant;" both doctrines seek to avoid 
contracts which are designed to be traps for the unwary; both 
doctrines avoid enforcing terms which contain unfair sur-
prise.335 While the doctrine of procedural unconscionability 
deals explicitly with concerns of "unfair surprise,"336 and the 
concept of adhesion focuses on unequal bargaining power,337 the 
similarities between these two doctrines is, nevertheless, strik-
ing. California combines these two doctrines by equating adhe-
sion contracts with procedural unconscionability.33B While the 
330 [d. 
331 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
332 Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
333 Compare [d. with Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893 (failing to find contract pro-
cedurally unconscionable). 
334 Compare Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825 (describing doctrine of unconscionabil-
ity) with [d. at 824 (describing adhesion contracts). 
335 [d.; Kosel, supra note 7. 
336 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 825. 
337 [d. at 824. 
338 Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
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Hutcherson court does not explicitly state that it equates pro-
cedural unconscionability with adhesiveness/39 any distinction 
between the two doctrines is immaterial. 340 
D. IMMATERIAL WHETHER COURTS FOLLOW CALIFORNIA'S 
RULE THAT ADHESION CONTRACTS ARE PROCEDURALLY 
UNCONSCIONABLE 
The outcome in Hutcherson would have been the same 
even if the court applied California law. The Hutcherson court 
enforced the disputed contract, finding a lack of procedural and 
substantive unconscionability.341 As the court found no sub-
stantive unconscionability, the contract would not have been 
enforced under California law.342 California requires both pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability before a contract 
may be successfully challenged.343 Without a finding of some 
degree of substantive unconscionability, even the most adhe-
sive contracts will be enforced under California law.344 
Even if the Hutcherson court had found some form of sub-
stantive unconscionability, however, application of the Califor-
nia presumption that adhesion contracts are procedurally un-
conscionable would not likely have altered the Hutcherson 
court's holding. As stated above, the Hutcherson court did not 
explicitly rule on whether the contract at bar was an adhesion 
contract.345 By the court's judgment, though, the contract was 
procedurally sound.346 Subjectively, the contract in Hutcherson 
may be considered adhesive as it was offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.347 The Hutcherson court points out, however, 
that "[t]he plaintiff was given a clear choice-he could accept or 
reject the arbitration provision."348 A more consumer-friendly 
339 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
340 See infra notes 341-351 and accompanying text. 
341 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94,900. 
342 Compare [d. at 894 (finding a lack of substantive unconscionability) with Ar-
mendariz, 6 P.3d at 690 (stating that, under California law, for a contract to be void 
due to unconscionability, there must be both substantive and procedural unconscion-
ability). 
343 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
344 [d. 
345 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 893-94. 
346 [d. at 894 (finding a lack of procedural unconscionability). 
347 [d. at 888-89 (discussing terms of contract which was unilaterally offered to 
consumer). 
348 [d. at 892. 
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court may have arrived at a different determination as to 
whether the contract was either adhesive or procedurally un-
conscionable; however, the mere application of California law 
would have little effect on the court's ruling.349 The Hutcherson 
court's determination that the contract is enforceable is not 
dependant on which test the court uses, but, rather, dependant 
upon judicial interpretation.350 The ruling, in the end, comes 
down to the subjective perspective ofthe court.351 
IV. MAKING CALIFORNIA ADHESION CONTRACT LAw MORE 
CONSUMER FRIENDLY 
As previously stated, adhesion contracts are a necessary 
part of the way companies deal with consumers.352 The effects 
of these contracts, however, can be devastating to consumers.353 
Some commentators suggest that adhesion contracts should be 
unenforceable per se.354 The California courts have not adopted 
this extreme approach.355 Instead, California refuses to enforce 
these contracts when they contain provisions which are outside 
the consumer's reasonable expectations or when they contain 
provisions that are unconscionable.356 These theories-the doc-
trine of unconscionability and reasonable expectations-
purport to protect consumers from adhesion contracts.357 Yet, 
adhesion contracts often take advantage of the consumer by 
imposing terms which the consumer is either not aware of or 
would not agree to if given a choice.358 
California law goes a long way towards protecting the con-
sumer from overreaching contracts.359 By definition, adhesion 
contracts are not true bargains.360 They do not represent the 
will of both contracting parties.361 Adhesion contracts represent 
349 See [d. 
350 See [d. 
351 Hutcherson, 793 N.E.2d at 892. 
352 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297-298. 
353 Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. 
354 Rakoff, supra note 101, at 1176. 
355 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
356 [d. 
357 [d. 
356 Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 780. 
359 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
360 [d. 
361 [d. 
35
Sterkin: Challenging Adhesion Contracts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2004
320 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
the will of only the drafting party.362 Accordingly, California 
should improve its laws for dealing with adhesion contracts. 
The following suggestions would greatly benefit consumers 
while maintaining, for companies, all the benefits which the 
use of adhesion contracts currently allows. 
A. COURTS SHOULD REQUIRE ACTUAL NOTICE 
The first safeguard that California currently imposes is 
that a contract be within a party's reasonable expectations.363 
A party, however, need not be specifically aware of a contract's 
provisions in order for California courts to enforce the con-
tract.364 For most contracts, it is enough that the provisions be 
clearly worded and prominently displayed.365 The courts, how-
ever, treat adhesive insurance contracts with more suspicion, 
and require exclusionary language be called to the attention of 
the insured.366 
The system which the courts currently use for insurance 
contracts should be applied to all adhesion contracts.367 It is 
not enough that a drafter displays a contractual provision in 
bold letters.3SS The reality is that most people enter into scores 
of adhesion contracts every year.369 People enter into adhesion 
contracts for basic utility services,370 travel, housing accommo-
dations, insurance,371 and financial services.372 Adhesion con-
tracts are sent to parties through the maip73 and given to pa-
tients who seek admission to hospitals.374 Most people neither 
understand nor even read these contracts.375 It is not enough 
that provisions in these contracts are prominently displayed.376 
The courts should require actual notice. 
362 [d. 
363 [d. 
364 Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
365 [d. 
366 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
367 [d. 
368 See Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
369 Friedmann, supra note 2, at 45. 
370 See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1133. 
371 Friedmann, supra note 2, at 45. 
372 See Bank One, 125 F. Supp. 2d at 82l. 
373 See Ting, 319 F.3d at 1134. 
374 See Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 779. 
375 [d. 
376 See, e.g., Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
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The court in Jones held that, in adhesive insurance con-
tracts, the insurer should explain exclusionary language to the 
insured.377 The same rule should apply to all adhesion con-
tracts. It is cost prohibitive for companies to negotiate sepa-
rate contracts with each of their customers.378 Adhesion con-
tracts are, therefore, economically necessary. 379 At no great 
cost, however, adhesion contracts could be accompanied by a 
brief, plain language explanation of their terms and conditions. 
This notice should take the form of a plainly worded letter (for 
mailed contracts) or a simple verbal explanation (for contracts 
entered into on a face-to-face basis). 
Requiring actual notice would greatly assist consumers. 
Contracting consumers would know exactly what types of bar-
gains they were entering. With the element of unfair surprise 
removed, consumers would be far less likely to bring costly liti-
gation to dispute the terms of their contracts. Additionally, 
requiring actual notice would limit the detrimental effect that 
adhesion contracts have on consumers. If companies were re-
quired to explicitly spell out the contents of their contracts, 
these companies would be less likely to impose oppressive 
clauses upon consumers.3BO Companies could still enjoy the 
economic benefits of offering their contracts on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis.3s1 With actual notice, however, consumers would 
enjoy the benefit of a true bargain. Upon receiving notice of 
the contractual terms, consumers could make well informed 
decisions to either enter the bargain or, where possible, with-
draw and take their business elsewhere. 
B. LOWERING THE BAR FOR PROCEDURAL UNCON-
SCIONABILITY 
Certain problematic, and typically oppressive, prOVISIons 
show up in adhesion contracts repeatedly.3B2 As previously 
stated, because adhesive contracts are considered procedurally 
377 Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
378 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297-298. 
379 [d. 
380 See Jones, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 379. 
381 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297-298. 
382 See Schwartz, supra note 16, at 809 (stating that businesses frequently use 
arbitration clauses); Ting, 319 F.3d at 381 (arbitration clause placed into adhesion 
contract). 
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unconscionable, courts are unlikely to enforce any substan-
tively unconscionable provision in an adhesion contract.383 In 
order for courts to throw out a provision in an adhesion con-
tract, however, courts must find some degree of substantive 
unconscionability.384 
The bar for determining whether a contractual provision is 
substantively unconscionable should be very low when dealing 
with adhesion contracts. Substantive unconscionability en-
compasses the notion that contractual terms are "one-sided" or 
"overly harsh. "385 An adhesion contract is, by its very nature, a 
one-sided endeavor.386 Adhesion contracts are drafted by a 
party with superior bargaining power and presented to the ad-
hering party to be either accepted as a whole or rejected.387 The 
fact that these contracts are drafted exclusively by one party, 
with no opportunity for the adhering party to negotiate, should 
create greater suspicion in the courts than is currently exhib-
ited.388 
Terms which may otherwise be enforced should be looked 
upon with a high level of suspicion when contained in adhesion 
contracts. In determining whether a term in an adhesion con-
tract is substantively unconscionable, and thereby unenforce-
able, the courts should ask whether the term was in the adher-
ent's best interest at the time the party entered into the 
agreement. It is not enough to show that the adherent agreed 
to the contract. Parties seeking to enforce adhesion contracts 
should have to demonstrate that the provisions would have 
been accepted had the adhering party had an opportunity to 
negotiate. 
Courts recognize the necessity of adhesion contracts.389 
There is, however, no justification in allowing companies to 
force-feed oppressive terms to consumers.390 If a company can-
not draft a fair and reasonable adhesion contract, the contract 
should not be enforced. Adhesion contracts reduce business 
costs and allow the company to deal with countless customers 
383 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
384 [d. 
385 Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 145. 
386 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
387 [d. 
388 [d. 
389 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297·298. 
390 See Scissor-Tail, 623 P.2d at 171. 
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on equal footing.391 This goal can easily be achieved while pro-
tecting the basic interests and rights of consumers. 
Once a court determines that a contract is adhesive, all 
provisions in that contract should become highly suspicious. 
The court should assume that the consumer has been placed at 
a disadvantage and that the consumer had no power to partici-
pate in any sort of negotiation of the contract. As a result, the 
court should carefully examine the contract and enforce only 
those provisions which may have been contained in a negoti-
ated agreement. Only then will consumers receive a fair deal 
in an adhesive context. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Consumers need judicial protection from oppressive con-
tractual terms. Consumers cannot rely on inserting an adden-
dum to their contracts, as did the Rebars.392 There need to be 
solid rules governing adhesion contracts which will protect all 
consumers. In constructing such rules, courts must consider 
both the necessity of adhesion contracts, and their possible 
dangers. Currently, California courts go a long way towards 
protecting consumers.393 California courts will not enforce pro-
visions in adhesion contracts found to be outside the parties' 
reasonable expectations.394 Once a contract is deemed adhesive, 
California courts consider the contract procedurally uncon-
scionable. 395 If an adhesion contract also contains elements of 
substantively unconscionability, California courts will refuse to 
enforce the contract.396 
These efforts by the California courts to shield consumers 
from oppressive terms in adhesion contracts are helpful, but 
not perfect. Many consumers are still stuck with unfavorable 
provisions to which they would never have agreed to if given 
the chance.397 For greater consumer protection, the courts 
should go beyond the concepts of reasonable expectations and 
unconscionability. Before binding consumers to a provision in 
391 Sybert, supra note 18, at 297-298. 
392 Harris, supra note 10. 
393 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689. 
394 [d. 
395 Flores, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382. 
396 Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690. 
397 See Allan, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 824. 
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an adhesion contract, the courts should require a showing of 
actual, not constructive notice.39B Further, the courts should 
lower the bar which determines whether a provision in an ad-
hesion contract is substantively unconscionable. Courts should 
examine provisions in adhesion contracts with great scrutiny, 
enforcing only those provisions to which a consumer with full 
bargaining power would have agreed. Adhesion contracts are a 
necessity;399 consumer injustice is not. These adjustments to the 
California system will rebalance the scales and place parties of 
unequal bargaining power back on equal footing. 
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